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Successful human social interaction depends on our capacity to understand other
people’s mental states and to anticipate how they will react to our actions. Despite
its importance to the human condition, the exact mechanisms underlying our ability to
understand another’s actions, feelings, and thoughts are still a matter of conjecture.
Here, we consider this problem from philosophical, psychological, and neuroscientific
perspectives. In a critical review, we demonstrate that attempts to draw parallels across
these complementary disciplines is premature: The second-person perspective does not
map directly to Interaction or Simulation theories, online social cognition, or shared neural
network accounts underlying action observation or empathy. Nor does the third-person
perspective map onto Theory-Theory (TT), offline social cognition, or the neural networks
that support Theory of Mind (ToM). Moreover, we argue that important qualities of social
interaction emerge through the reciprocal interplay of two independent agents whose
unpredictable behavior requires that models of their partner’s internal state be continually
updated. This analysis draws attention to the need for paradigms in social neuroscience
that allow two individuals to interact in a spontaneous and natural manner and to adapt
their behavior and cognitions in a response contingent fashion due to the inherent
unpredictability in another person’s behavior. Even if such paradigms were implemented, it
is possible that the specific neural correlates supporting such reciprocal interaction would
not reflect computation unique to social interaction but rather the use of basic cognitive
and emotional processes combined in a unique manner. Finally, we argue that given the
crucial role of social interaction in human evolution, ontogeny, and every-day social life,
a more theoretically and methodologically nuanced approach to the study of real social
interaction will nevertheless help the field of social cognition to evolve.
Keywords: mentalizing, online/offline social cognition, second-person perspective, simulation, social interaction,
social neuroscience, stimulus independent thoughts, theory-theory
INTRODUCTION
Whether searching for a cure for life-threatening disease, devel-
oping a hybrid engine that reduces carbon emission, or simply
enjoying a barbecue in the park in the company of good friends,
understanding the desires, beliefs, and intentions of other people
is essential for almost every human endeavor. Despite the relative
ease with which we interact with others, philosophers, psycholo-
gists, and, most recently, neuroscientists have puzzled over how
exactly we gain sufficient access to the content of another’s mind.
Unlike other forms of mental content, such as the perception of
objects, we cannot directly experience what is on the minds of
others; most likely a process of social evolution or social learning
is responsible for our species expertise at simulating or predict-
ing how others will act, feel, or think. What remains less clear is
precisely how humans perform the feat ofmental dexterity known
as mental state attribution.
One possibility is that social interactions involve qualitatively
different processes than those perceptual, cognitive and motor
computations that subserve the processing of information about
the objective physical reality (Adolphs, 2010). Such a modu-
lar view of the mind (Fodor, 1983) would postulate that in
the case of mental state attribution in social contexts, specific
forms of knowledge and particular brainmodules exists that serve
these explicit social information processing functions. In cog-
nitive neuroscience, it has been debated whether certain brain
regions respond selectively to social stimuli, as in the case of faces,
the fusiform-face area (FFA) (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Kanwisher,
2000) or in the case of body parts, the extrastriate body area
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(EBA; Downing et al., 2001). Similarly, it has been argued that
the right temporal parietal junction (rTPJ) performs computa-
tions specifically related to the mental states of other individuals
(Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003). Such domain-specifc views of the
mind and brain has been criticised by advocates of a more dis-
tributed theory of mental processes in which information coding
and processing emerges from the brain’s dynamic and distributed
organization in space and time (e.g., Haxby et al., 2000; Mitchell,
2008 in the field of social neuroscience).
In this paper, we evaluate the evidence for exclusive social
information processing by critically reviewing the philosophi-
cal, psychological, and neuroscientific evidence regarding how we
understand other people’s thoughts, feelings, and actions. More
specifically, we first demonstrate that the philosophical concept
of second-person perspective taking can be used to point out
specific features of social cognition, as this notion of second-
person perspective taking is distinct from both the acquisition of
objective knowledge about the world and subjective knowledge
about the individual. We will then consider simulation, interac-
tive, narrative, and theory-theory (TT) accounts of mind reading
and summarize neuroscientific findings suggesting different neu-
ral networks underlying the ability to mentalize, empathize, and
understand the actions of others. Although superficial similar-
ities exist between the different modes of analysis, significant
problems emerge when the philosophical, psychological, and neu-
roscientific findings are simply mapped onto to each; we suggest
that attempts to unify these different levels of social cognition
may be premature. The last section (1) outlines different types
of models of social interaction that would be necessary to shed
light on the mechanisms of social interaction, (2) summarizes
the neuroscientific studies to date which have focused on social
interaction, and (3) discusses whether these findings can really
shed light on the “dark matter” of social neuroscience or whether
new paradigms are necessary to fill this gap. Here, we borrow
from the field of physical astronomy where “dark matter” is a
term for matter that cannot be directly detected via the existing
scientific instruments. Astrophysicists assume that this intangible
matter constitutes a stupefying 73%minimum of the total matter
in the universe (Lahanas and Nanopoulos, 2003)1. The physical
rules and elements of our universe are thus largely unexplored—
might this also hold for the neuroscientific investigation of social
interaction?
FIRST, SECOND, AND THIRD PERSON PERSPECTIVES
Psychologists and philosophers differ in their approaches, even
when they deal with the same phenomena. Broadly speaking,
psychologists usually focus on behavioral differences and the
underlying cognitive and emotional mechanisms, while philoso-
phers tend to concentrate on conceptual and normative issues.
When it comes to social cognition, the picture is sometimes a
bit more complicated, partly due to an intensive cooperation
1We thank one of the reviewers for pointing toward a paper with a similar title
(Zhang and Raichle, 2010). The authors refer to the same equation (75% of
the matter in the universe counts as dark energy, and we quote Lahanas and
Nanopoulos, 2003, saying that 73%does). However, Zhang and Raichle (2010)
use the term “dark energy” in the context of brain metabolism and not like us
to refer to social interaction.
between philosophers and psychologists. Still, psychologists typ-
ically investigate the relevant mechanisms with experimental
methodologies, while philosophers try to find out, for example,
whether social cognition creates a specific sort of knowledge—
a second-person perspective that is systematically different from
the third-person perspective of the world and our own first-
person knowledge about ourselves.
The idea that an intersubjective epistemic perspective has to
be added to the subjective first-person and the objective third-
person perspective is by no means new. The basic idea can already
be traced back to the beginning of the last century in the work of
Heidegger (1927/1975, 1927/1986) and Mead (1925, 1926, 1934).
More recent versions that use the metaphor of a “second-person
perspective” can be found in Varela and Shear (1999); Bohman
(2000); Davidson (2004); Habermas (2004); and Reddy (2008),
for an overview see Lindemann (2006).
The idea has gained momentum in recent years with the
advance of social neuroscience. Research in this area has resulted
in an increasing demand for a clarification as to what kind of
knowledge understanding other minds is, how this knowledge is
acquired, and whether or not it can be separated from other kinds
of knowledge acquisition.
This requires a closer investigation of how the notion of the
“second-person” is currently utilized in the literature. Varela and
Shear (1999) as well as Petitmengin (2006) introduced the term
for an interview method by which subjective first-person expe-
riences are gathered as “data” with the help of another “second”
person. This approach, especially its underlying idea of the physi-
cal presence of a second-person, may have influenced other fields
like developmental psychology (Reddy, 2008) and neuroscience
(Schilbach, 2010; Schilbach et al., 2010a; Wilms et al., 2010).
Still, there is unclear usage of a number of similar terms. For
example, the confusing use of similar terms such as “second-
person account,” “second-person engagements,” “second-person
experiences” (Schilbach et al., in press), and “second-person per-
spective” demonstrate a lack of a common language. Here we will
focus on the concept of second-person perspective, as it seems to
be essential in social cognition.
One crucial question in defining second-person perspective is
whether social interaction with a verbatim second-person plays a
decisive role. This seems, for example, to be Schilbach’s (2010)
view. He postulates, “social cognition is fundamentally different
when an individual is actively and directly interacting with others.
In such cases, an individual adopts a “second-person perspective”
in which interaction with the other can be thought of as essential
or even constitutive for social cognition, rather than merely observ-
ing others and relying on a “first- (or third-) person grasp” of their
mental states.” (p. 1).
Wilms et al. (2010) use the term “online interaction” instead of
“online social cognition.” Assumingly, what they wish to express
is social cognition which is in place during real-life interac-
tion. Moreover, they use this as a synonym for second-person
perspective taking: “‘Online’ interaction crucially involves [. . . ]
establishing reciprocal relations where actions feed directly into the
communication loop [. . . ]. This has been referred to as adopting
a “second-person-perspective” [. . . ] which can be taken to suggest
that awareness of mental states results from being psychologically
engaged with someone and being an active participant of reciprocal
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interaction thereby establishing a subject-subject (“Me-You”) rather
than a subject-object (“Me-She/He”) relationship.” (p. 1).
Others (De Jaegher et al., 2010) define social cognition with-
out any reference to the second-person perspective. Although
stressing the relevance of a comparatively strong version of inter-
action for the development of social cognition, De Jaegher et al.
(2010) concede that social cognition may occur in the absence of
interaction, e.g., in remote observation of social scenes.
With these observations in mind, we can start to character-
ize social cognition as the acquisition of knowledge2 about other
persons’ mental states, i.e., their beliefs, desires, and intentions
and also insight about the meaning of their utterings. It would
follow that social cognition includes at least two essential features
that should be accounted for with any definition. First, social cog-
nition is a means of knowledge acquisition. We suggest that this
aspect can be specified by referring to the distinction between the
second-person perspective, on the one hand, and the first- and
third-person perspective on the other. Second, social cognition
occurs in social contexts. One way to specify this aspect is to ask
whether or not the subjects involved interact, i.e., whether they
are engaged in online or offline social cognition. Taking inter-
action as a reciprocal pattern of action and reaction3 between
at least two agents affecting each other, we assume that knowl-
edge about other persons can be acquired without interacting
with them, for example, when one reads a letter or watches a
movie describing another person’s mental states. Consequently,
we argue that second-person perspective taking can happen with-
out direct interaction and that this perspective is, therefore, not
synonymous with being engaged in interaction or online social
cognition. Rather, treating interaction and perspective taking as
two different aspects of social cognition results in a much more
differentiated and suitable view.
Perspectives, in a nutshell, are ways of acquiring knowledge
(for more details see Pauen, 2012). Perspectival distinctions
answer questions like: (1) “What is this knowledge about?” and
(2) “How do we acquire this knowledge?” First-person per-
spective taking provides self-knowledge. So, reflecting on the
questions posed above, first-person knowledge (1) is about the
subject’s own mental states and (2) is acquired directly via those
very mental states that are directly accessible only for the sub-
ject him or herself. It can, thus be characterized as subjective
because it is acquired by and is about the subject’s own men-
tal states (Pauen, 2010). Third-person knowledge, by contrast,
(1) is about all kinds of objective (and mostly external) facts,
both scientific and non-scientific and (2) it is acquired by all
kinds of objective evidence that is accessible to everyone, among
them external observation and scientific methods. As a con-
sequence, the third-person perspective can be characterized as
“objective.”
2We do not only refer to “justified true beliefs,” but to a broader definition of
knowledge.
3Normally, this includes several cycles of action and reaction, but it seems
unreasonable to talk about interaction if there is not at least one such cycle by
every agent involved. This is in line with Wilms et al. (2010) who state that
“online” interaction [rather: online social cognition; authors’ note] crucially
involves [. . . ] establishing reciprocal relations where actions feed directly into
the communication loop.”
But why is it necessary to add a second-person perspective to
the first- and third-person perspective to begin with? In order to
see this, imagine that you are locating a restaurant in an unfamil-
iar city. In this endeavor the third-person perspective is helpful
because the eatery has a definite location in space that can be
assessed by consulting a map. By contrast, you apply the first-
person perspective when you wonder whether it is worth stopping
for a pretzel to slake your hunger before completing the journey:
Are you really that hungry? But when you reach your destina-
tion a quarter of an hour late because of this detour, and being
full yourself, you need to find out how your companion feels. Is
she still hungry? Is she angry because you are late? Or would she
like to go to another place? In assessing our companion’s state the
first-person perspective provides no information because, unless
they also stopped for dinner, their mental state is different to our
own. Likewise, the third-person perspective cannot be of assis-
tance because there are no objective facts upon which to assess
the person’s thoughts and feelings.
Thus, our capacity to infer our companions feelings is a
paradigmatic case of social cognition which is set apart both from
third- and first-person perspective taking by at least two distinc-
tive features. First, unlike first-person perspective taking, it is not
about one’s own mental states. Second, unlike the third-person
perspective, it is not just about facts. Rather, social cognition
is a question regarding another person’s mental states; i.e., it is
about what our companion thinks, what she feels, and what her
intentions are.
But how does social cognition relate to our capacity to acquire
knowledge? Social cognition is neither about pure objective data
as in third-person perspective taking, nor is it the application of
our subjective mental states, as in first-person perspective taking.
Instead, social cognition is a means of knowledge acquisition that
involves a combination of both. Just as in first-person perspec-
tive taking, we draw on our own feelings and experiences during
social cognition in order to access the other person’s feelings
and experiences. Likewise, social cognition is like third-person
perspective taking when we draw on our general background
knowledge as well as on the person’s behavior, gestures, and
facial play to understand why they are acting as they are. It is
clear that knowledge that we gain by taking the second-person
perspective is neither purely objective nor subjective; it is inter-
subjective because it requires that we understand the other as a
person with their own thoughts, feelings, and experiences 4. In
other words, the second-person perspective is set apart from the
first- and the third-person perspective both in terms of its relation
to (1) knowledge content and (2) knowledge acquisition (Pauen,
2012).
Note, first, that only first- and second-person perspective
taking are restricted regarding their objects; third-person per-
spective taking is not. As a consequence, you can take the third-
person perspective regarding your own or another person’s pain
experience, for example by drawing on objective fMRI data or
skin-conductance measures. Second, as already indicated above,
4So even if we draw on our own feelings and thoughts in order to under-
stand another person’s feelings and thoughts, we have to understand that we
are referring to the other person. Thus, empathizing would, but emotional
contagion would not count as full-fledged second-person perspective taking.
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the present notion of second-person perspective taking does not
require interaction—even though interaction certainly plays an
important role in the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development
of social cognition in general and second-person perspective tak-
ing more specifically. Still, interaction is not an epistemic feature
itself. That is why epistemic access might be completely identi-
cal, regardless of whether or not there is interaction. In order to
see this, think about someone who tries to figure out whether
another person is angry and does so by taking the other person’s
perspective. This can happen if one is interacting with some-
one who is (1) physically present, (2) the person can be seen
in a movie, or (3) is a character in a novel. Epistemic access to
the other person’s thoughts and feelings might be identical in
all three of these cases. What differs here are non-epistemic fea-
tures; for example that the other person reacts in the first case
but does not in the second and the third cases. Conversely, inter-
actions can take place without second-person perspective taking,
for example if the epistemic subject interacts with another per-
son for whom only objective information is available. Given that
second-person perspective taking (like first- and third-person
perspective taking) is an epistemic feature, these differences do
not matter for an assessment of the perspective that an individ-
ual adopts during the interaction, even if such issues are of great
importance in other respects. For this reason, we suggest that
differences regarding interaction should be denoted by the dis-
tinction between offline and online social cognition and not by
perspectival distinctions. This is in line with similar considera-
tions by Mead, Habermas, and Bohman who understand second-
person perspective taking—either implicitly or explicitly—as a
way of interpreting others, regardless of whether or not they are
present.
SOCIAL COGNITION: THEORIES FROM PHILOSOPHY
AND PSYCHOLOGY
Other theories discussed in philosophy, psychology, and recently
also in neuroscience have rather focused on explaining the
mechanisms underlying our ability to understand other minds,
feelings, and actions. These theories try to find answers to the
common questions: How can we tell what another person’s
mental states are? How can we predict and explain the behavior
of others, i.e., what are the psychological processes that allow for
mindreading? First, we discuss the debate of Simulation-Theory
(ST) and Theory-Theory (TT) vs. interactive and narrative
accounts and then we turn to clarifying different accounts of on-
vs. offline social cognition.
SIMULATION-THEORY vs. THEORY-THEORY
Two prominent approaches to mindreading commonly described
in the literature are TT and ST. TT and ST are not simply psy-
chological theories, but are similarly rooted and largely debated
in philosophy, as well as in neuroscience (e.g., see Gallese and
Goldman, 1998; Keysers and Gazzola, 2007). According to TT
(e.g., Sellars, 1956; Gopnik, 1993), the psychological process
that enables us to understand others’ minds consists of theoriz-
ing, as there is no direct access to the mental states of others.
Instead, mental states of others are concealed entities, which,
while unobservable, can be calculated implicitly or explicitly. If
shortly after meeting our friend in the restaurant we saw signs
of uneasiness, we would be in a position to infer that our com-
panion was still hungry. To do so, we draw on common sense
knowledge about the signs of hungriness but, more importantly,
on our knowledge about social norms, i.e., good manners. Here
we might rely on a general rule or societal norm. In this case, it is
that not being on time is impolite and thus causes disapproval.
According to ST (e.g., Goldman, 2005), mental state attribu-
tion is a process-driven rather than a theory-driven mechanism
that allows us to understand other minds. We are able to under-
stand others as we generate (or embody) states in ourselves that
are similar to the other’s mental states. We simulate what we
would experience if we were the other person. Unlike the TT
viewpoint, this process relies far less on explicit knowledge, and
instead depends upon the capacity of the individual to put one-
self in the other’s mental shoes. In the example of the dinner date,
ST would argue that we might find out about our friend’s state
directly based on imagining ourselves in our friend’s situation.
So, if our companion ate rapidly as soon as the waiter brought her
food to the table, we could translate this non-verbal enthusiasm
into a state of hunger in our companion.
INTERACTION THEORY
Phenomenologists recently introduced the Interaction-Theory
(IT) as an alternative to ST and TT (see Gallagher, 2008).
Following Husserl’s and Scheler’s tradition, IT postulates that
most of the mental states of others are incorporated and visi-
ble in the “Leib,” the “lived body.” According to Gangopadhyay
and Schilbach (2012), there is plenty of empirical evidence that
experiencing others’ mental states, i.e., having an immediate per-
ceptual access to the perception of their embodied intentionality
is possible due to the tight coupling of action and perception.
Hence, the problem of understanding others minds depends
neither on explicit theorizing nor simulation, but on direct inter-
action embedded in a concrete interpersonal realm. The mental
states of others are not “hidden” per se and do not always have to
be consciously inferred. The question is, however, how exactly do
we perceive other minds in direct interaction? What does “direct”
mean in the first place (see Zahavi, 2011, for more details)?
Furthermore, understanding others feels qualitatively different
than having an experience from the first-person perspective. But
what the IT yields is a more contextual and embodied look at the
problem of other minds.
THE NARRATIVE PRACTICE HYPOTHESIS
The Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH; Hutto, 2007) is yet
another approach to social cognition. The NPH postulates that
being told stories about others’ mental states from an early age
allows children to understand other persons’ inner lives in partic-
ular contexts. There is a lot of empirical evidence for the linguistic
and narrative competence in the development of a theory of mind
(ToM) (Woolfe et al., 2002). However, because a basic under-
standing of implicit rules and theories is necessary for narrative
comprehension and ToM, the NPH appears to be a legitimate
refinement of TT rather than a novel approach to the understand-
ing of other minds (Przyrembel, thesis in preparation). Therefore,
being told stories certainly broadens the ability to understand
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others, but it is not a completely theory-independent explanation
for understanding other minds.
ONLINE vs. OFFLINE SOCIAL COGNITION
Most social neuroscience studies to date have focused on under-
standing the effects of socially relevant stimuli on the mind of an
individual, i.e., an isolated understanding of our own thoughts
and feelings. In contrast, the study of social interaction involves a
bidirectional relation between two or more agents as well as the
impact of the social context in which they emerge. It is concerned
with understanding how two minds mutually shape each other
through reciprocal interactions (see Frith, 2003; Singer et al.,
2004c). An investigation of social interaction also needs to under-
stand how we communicate thoughts and feelings to another
mind to enable this person to build an appropriate representa-
tion of our thoughts and feelings that will ultimately be fed back
to ensure there has not been any misunderstanding. In a keynote
lecture Frith (2003) referred to such a mechanism underlying
this kind of real-life social interaction as “Neural Hermeneutics.”
Based on this view, it has recently been suggested that social cog-
nition involves two distinct modes, which are also known as the
“offline” or “online mode”; whereas the former refers to agents
passively viewing another agent during social interaction, the
latter refers to an reciprocal interaction in which two or more
agents are involved in real-life social engagement and in which
the behavior of one leads to a change in another person’s behavior
(Schilbach et al., 2006; Wilms et al., 2010).
Note however, that in current papers, we find a quite hetero-
geneous usage of the terms. Mojzisch et al. (2006, see p. 185) as
well as Schilbach et al. (2006, see p. 718) speak of on- vs. offline
Theory of Mind (ToM). Wilms et al. (2010) refer sometimes to
on- vs. offline mentalizing (p. 1), and sometimes to on- vs. offline
social cognition (p. 8). While social cognition is, however, gen-
erally used as an umbrella term for all socially relevant processes
and thus includes also action intention understanding, affective
resonance and empathy, face recognition, social memory, and
many others, mentalizing is usually reserved to specifically denote
cognitive perspective taking processes and the underlying ToM
network. Therefore, we prefer to use the term of on- or offline
social cognition in the context of the present paper.
It is furthermore worth noting that in these papers, the terms
online/offline with respect to social cognition are used in a way
that is contrary to the way that these processes are generally
understood and discussed in cognitive neuroscience. According to
this view, states of offline, or decoupled cognition, tend to emerge
in situations in which the mind generates streams of thoughts
that have minimal direct correlation to ongoing perceptual events
and are often defined as stimulus independent thoughts (SIT).
These SIT can also subserve either inferences about other peo-
ple’s minds, or, alternatively, reasoning about the self and the
world (Smallwood et al., 2008, 2011; Barron et al., 2011; Kam
et al., 2011). The offline mode of social cognition proposed by
Schilbach and colleagues, in contrast, does not refer to SIT, as the
subjects in the scanner do receive social stimuli from direct online
perception; these subjects are simply not addressed by these stim-
uli or engaged in the social encounter, and this is why this kind of
social cognition is called offline social cognition.
FIRST, SECOND, AND THIRD PERSON PERSPECTIVES
vs. OFFLINE AND ONLINE SOCIAL COGNITION
Nowwhat about the relation between perspectival distinctions on
the one hand and on- and offline social cognition on the other? To
evaluate these definitions of online and offline social cognition,
it is necessary to examine how they compare to the philosoph-
ical definitions of different perspectives of knowledge that are
involved in any attempt to understand another mind.While inter-
action is essential for the difference between off- and online social
cognition, it does not play an important role in second-person
perspective taking. Given that perspectives are means of epistemic
access, it should be epistemic features that are decisive for per-
spectival distinctions. Even if interaction plays an important role
in many cases of second-person perspective taking, as well as in
the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of social skills, it
is not an epistemic feature itself. That is why epistemic access
or, more specifically, evidence (one’s own mental states, social
norms) and type of knowledge (another person’s mental states)
set the second-person perspective apart from first- and third-
person perspectives. On the other hand, it is interaction rather
than epistemic access that makes the difference between on- and
offline social cognition. So, even though interactions certainly
have important neurobiological effects, this does not constitute
evidence of a unique epistemic perspective. One of the reasons
why this distinction is important is that epistemic access to the
mental states of the other person might be completely identical,
regardless of whether or not there is interaction.
NEUROSCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE FOR MULTIPLE SYSTEMS
UNDERLYING SOCIAL COGNITION
In the last decades, social neuroscience hasmade progress in refin-
ing models of social cognition. These studies have revealed that
there are several neural routes to the understanding of another
person’s actions, feelings, and thoughts. Three major routes have
reliably been identified as being crucial for our ability to under-
stand others, namely (1) motor actions and motor intentions—
the so-called mirror neuron system (MNS), (2) beliefs, desires,
and thoughts—the so-called ToM or mentalizing system, and
(3) emotional and bodily states—relating to our ability to
empathize with others.
Each of these abilities is associated with different brain circuits.
Early research on the discovery of the mirror neurons in macaque
monkeys (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti
et al., 1996; for a review see Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro, 2010)
suggested that the same cells, which are activated when a mon-
key is performing a particular grasp, also fire if the same monkey
merely observes another during the same action. Later research
in humans, mostly using fMRI, demonstrated “shared networks”
between self-performed and vicariously perceived actions acti-
vate similar regions in the human brain. The identified neural
network comprised the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), the ventral
premotor cortex, and the caudal part of the inferior frontal gyrus
(IFG) (Dinstein et al., 2007; Gazzola et al., 2007; Etzel et al., 2008,
for reviews see Blakemore and Decety, 2001; Grèzes and Decety,
2001).
This research was subsequently expanded to the domain of
emotions and empathy (Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Gallese,
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2001; Preston and deWaal, 2002) culminating in the emergence
of empathy research in the field of social neuroscience (for
reviews see Decety and Jackson, 2004; de Vignemont and Singer,
2006; Keysers and Gazzola, 2006, 2009; Singer and Lamm, 2009).
A multitude of imaging experiments in humans in the domain of
empathy for pain, disgust, taste, and touch revealed that, in con-
trast to mirror neuron networks, in the domain of motor actions,
sharing sensations and feelings with others engages somatosen-
sory cortices, as well as anterior parts of the insula and anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC; Keysers et al., 2010; Fan et al., 2011;
Lamm et al., 2011). In addition to this affective route, researchers
have distinguished a cognitive route which is helpful for under-
standing the beliefs, thoughts, and desires of other people. This
“mentalizing,” “ToM”, or “cognitive perspective taking” (Premack
and Woodruff, 1978; Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Frith and Frith,
1999, 2003; Baron-Cohen et al., 2000) network typically com-
prises areas in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), precuneus,
superior temporal sulcus (STS), and rTPJ (for reviews see Frith
and Frith, 1999, 2003; Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Saxe et al., 2004;
Amodio and Frith, 2006; Saxe, 2006; Mitchell, 2009).
Many of these neural systems are also recruited when indi-
viduals are not interacting in a social context. For example, the
mPFC is activated by tasks involving the evaluation of the per-
sonality of the self and others (Kelley et al., 2002; Macrae et al.,
2004; Mitchell et al., 2006), as well as by the task of assessing the
likelihood of enjoyment of activities that will occur in the future
(Tamir and Mitchell, 2011). Likewise, regions including the TPJ,
the mPFC, and the PCC are recruited when thinking becomes
decoupled from the events in the here and now and stimulus
independentmental contents form the cornerstone for conscious-
ness (Mason et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009; Smallwood et al.,
2011; Stawarzyck et al., 2011). Taken together, the fact that simi-
lar neural processes are engaged during self-referential processes
and social interactions, as well as internally generated thoughts
with no explicit external referent, suggests that many forms of
social cognition are likely to be involved in a more general set
of processes that allow the mind to devote processing resources
to make predictions necessary for navigation through social life
(Frith, 2007).
Finally, an enormous amount of work has been performed in
the domain of the neural networks underlying the recognition of
facial emotional and non-emotional expressions. For this social
cognitive ability, brain regions such as the amygdala, secondary
somatosensory cortices, and FFA seem to be particular relevant
(Adolphs, 2002; Kanwisher and Yovel, 2006).
INTEGRATION OF THESE DIVERSE APPROACHES
As is clear from the review of philosophical, psychological, and
neuroscientific approaches, the problem of understanding others
minds has been addressed by different disciplines using several
different methods. There seems to be an implicit assumption
among many scholars studying social cognition that despite
differences in these approaches, there is a close link between
the third-person perspective, TT, and offline social cognition on
the one hand and the second-person perspective, IT, ST, and
the online mode, including empathy on the other. Moreover, it
is often argued that these different modes depend on different
neural networks. The next section of this paper critically reviews
the extent to which such a dichotomous view of social interac-
tion across the different domains of philosophy, psychology, and
neuroscience is realistic.
ST AND TT vs. FIRST, SECOND, AND THIRD PERSON PERSPECTIVE
As we have already argued, a theory of second-person perspec-
tive taking should describe a specific sort of knowledge. More
precisely, it must specify the object of this knowledge (another
person’s mental states) and the relevant evidence (one’s own
experiences, feelings, social norms, etc.), and finally it tells us
something about the relational status of this knowledge (inter-
subjective). Again, these specifications do not encompass the
underlying psychological or neurobiological mechanisms. They
only specify the criteria any mechanism needs to meet in order to
realize second-person perspective taking.
For the same reason, second-person perspective taking is
not just another word for simulation: It describes an epistemic
position rather than a psychological process. Simulation is one
implementation of second-person perspective taking; however,
second-person perspective taking may include automatic and
subpersonal replications of another person’s mental state or
explicit logical theorizing regarding what they must be thinking
or feeling. The latter might be involved when we try to account for
perspectival differences between our own point of view and the
perspective of the person that we are trying to understand, partic-
ular if we are not familiar with these differences. Openness with
respect to the psychological and neurobiological mechanisms is
of special importance. As we will argue below, second-person
perspective taking might be realized by a multitude of psycho-
logical processes beyond simulation and theorizing, as presented
in the NPH (Hutto, 2007) or the IT (Gallagher, 2008). There
is no reason to accept the dichotomous view outlined above.
Instead, we endorse Hybrid-Theories that incorporate elements
of ST and TT, as well as IT and NPH. Still, this openness has its
limits. Mere theorizing, combined with external observation of a
person’s behavior, does not constitute second-person perspective
taking; it is third-person perspective taking, because one’s own
mental states are not accessed in order to understand someone
else’s beliefs, desires, or feelings.
ST AND TT vs. NEUROSCIENCE
As mentioned above, scholars from different fields have recently
argued for a direct mapping between certain models, terms,
and theories in philosophy, developmental psychology, and social
neuroscience. Thus, it has been suggested that mirror neuron net-
works and “shared networks” underlie empathic understanding
and can be taken as evidence for ST or IT. TT approaches, by con-
trast, are mapped to ToM processes and their underlying neural
networks.
There are several problems to such an approach. First, it is
questionable how ST, IT, NPH, and TT accounts could ever be
translated into the language of neural processes and the brain.
What in terms of neuronal computations would simulation or
using a theory about the world actually mean? The difficulty of
mapping high-level constructs like these on brain organization
and functions is quite evident here. Many cognitive neuroscien-
tists prefer to take a more cautious approach and refer to “mirror
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neuron cells”, which have the property of processing one’s own
and others observed movements if there is access to single cell
recording. Alternatively, when referring to fMRI studies, so-called
“shared brain networks” are assumed to underlie the represen-
tation of emotions or actions in first-person and second-person
experience only when similar brain regions respond under both
conditions. Although the notion of mirror neurons and shared
network share many things in common at a gross theoretical level,
neuroscientists maintain the awareness that functional imaging
techniques reflect the activation of large assemblies of cells, while
single cell recording reveal the computations performed by a
single neuron. That is why these activations neither allow any
inference about the properties of the single cells nor about the
real computations subserved by these networks (e.g., Singer and
Lamm, 2009). In line with substantial evidence for predictive cod-
ing in the human brain (e.g., Schultz et al., 1997; Seymour et al.,
2004; O’Doherty et al., 2006; Frith, 2007), it is more likely that, for
example, activation in anterior insula when empathizing with the
pain of others rather reflects predictive models about the poten-
tial negative effects of pain (Singer et al., 2009; Lamm and Singer,
2010), which are also activated when we anticipate the effects of
impending pain in ourselves (Ploghaus et al., 1999).
Accordingly, rather than using the term simulation, it would
probably be closer to the biological reality of the brain to use
terms such as vicarious prediction or the activation of cortical
representations that have been generated through the perfor-
mance and experience of similar movement or affective experi-
ence in the self.
Second, even if we set these problems aside, recent findings
suggest that mapping TT to mentalizing of cognitive processes
and ST or IT to empathy or action understanding is incorrect.
Jason Mitchell, for example, has presented neuroscientific evi-
dence that we “simulate” others, even when we are in the domain
of mentalizing about cognitive states or abstract knowledge, like
political attitudes. This follows from a series of ToM or mentaliz-
ing studies, suggesting an important role ofmPFCwhen reflecting
on one’s own as well as other peoples’ mental states (Mitchell
et al., 2005). These studies also demonstrated functional differ-
ences between judging the mental states of similar and dissimilar
others, with the former activating parts of the ventral mPFC and
the latter dorsal parts of the prefrontal cortex (Mitchell et al.,
2006). Furthermore, Waytz and Mitchell (2011) stated that sim-
ulation consists not only of mirroring (“a vicarious response in
which a perceiver experiences the same current mental state as that
of another person,” p. 197), but also of self-projection (i.e., “imag-
ining oneself in the same situation as another person, predicting
one’s thoughts and feelings in that hypothetical scenario and assum-
ing that the other would think and feel the same way,” p. 197).
The latter again involves the mPFC. This suggest that even in
the domain of tasks that may seem as if these require an out-
right rule-governed, intellectual stance, we apparently use cortical
representations underlying the inference of such attributes for
ourselves to derive knowledge about the other—a process which
would map to ST rather than to TT.
On the other hand, empathy research has clearly shown that
when we empathize we only activate parts of the entire neu-
ral networks elicited when experiencing a certain emotion in
ourselves. As these representations in the anterior insula are also
observed in empathy for other unpleasant experiences, such as
disgust (Wicker et al., 2003) or obnoxious tastes (Jabbi et al.,
2007), and are modulated by contextual factors as well as person-
specific factors (for an overview see e.g., Hein and Singer, 2008),
it has been suggested that these activities stand for higher-level
representations of subjective feelings that have already integrated
both contextual information and information from the body into
global feeling states (Craig, 2009; Singer et al., 2009; Lamm and
Singer, 2010). This higher-level coding of information would
probably better map to information processing of abstract con-
tent than to simulation based on an automatic activation of
primary sensory networks.
Together, these results suggest that a direct match between
ST and the MNSs or empathy-networks vs. ToM-networks to
TT is problematic. Consequently, an unproductive “either/or
logic” concerning simulation and theorizing should be avoided,
as Mitchell (2005, p. 363) has suggested (see also Keysers and
Gazzola, 2007).
MODELS OF SOCIAL INTERACTION IN PSYCHOLOGY AND
SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE
In the previous section, we demonstrated that equating epis-
temic perspectives, cognitive processes, and neural mechanisms
underlying social cognition is problematic. Based on this analysis
we will now consider whether online social cognition is nec-
essarily the dark matter of social neuroscience. To address this
issue we must answer two further questions. First, what do we
actually mean when we talk about social interaction? And sec-
ond, do we really need to assume that there are neural networks
specifically dedicated to only processing the social world or social
interactions?
What does it take for an action to be real social interaction?
The experimental aim in social neuroscience, following Wilms
et al. (2010 who, in turn, follow Frith, 2007) consists in “closing
the loop between interaction partners” (p. 1). This means that the
action of one subject (henceforth A) should trigger a response of
her partner, a sentient being (henceforth B), which in turn influ-
ences A and A’s reaction. This particular feedback has a specific
effect on B resulting in a reaction in B that subsequently changes
A’s mental state and so on (see Figure 1, left panel). In every iter-
ation, each partner’s mental state is changed by his/her partner
and these new states form the basis of the next iteration of social
interaction. One basic feature of such a reciprocal interaction
is the occurrence of emergent qualities, i.e., the largely unpre-
dictable rearrangement of the already existing entities, namely
A and B’s possible reactions. Such emergence is only possible if
none of the involved subjects responses are controlled. Without
the essential unpredictability that occurs in natural social interac-
tion reciprocal changes in behavior would not occur. Along these
lines Schippers et al. (2010) stated that it is, therefore, difficult to
assess when one action ends and another starts (p. 9388; please
note that for this reason, the time of measurement in the left
panel of Figure 1 should be seen as no more than a formal ori-
entation). It is only when the design of the experiment allows for
an action possessing four specific criteria (dynamic interplay, a
virtually unlimited range of responses, living and uncontrolled
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FIGURE 1 | Two models of social interaction.
partners, and emergent qualities) that we can speak of real social
interaction.
Just consider an example of a fundamentally social form of
behavior such as tickling. Blakemore et al. (1998) have argued that
tickling, certainly a low-level, bottom-up, mostly pre-reflective
phenomenon is quintessentially social because, at least under
normal conditions, the sensation can only arise when another
individual delivers the touch. It has been proposed that the reason
we cannot tickle ourselves is that during self-generated move-
ments the brain produces a forward model that allows us to
predict the effects of tickling and thus cancel these effects out in
advance. When the touch is delivered by another, this model is
absent, making the touch unpredictable that, hence, leads to the
sensation of being tickled (Blakemore et al., 1998, 2000).
In contrast, the right panel in Figure 1 illustrates other ways
of modeling social interaction, which are relevant in the con-
text of present social neuroscience research. In these types of
social interaction, A’s behavior is studied under the full control
of B’s response (in experimental research, the presence of the sub-
ject’s interaction partner B is often feigned and therefore entirely
controlled by the experimenter). Strictly speaking, because A’s
behavior does not cause a novel and unpredictable response in
B, it is similar to a blind alley. B, being just an algorithm, would
always react independent of A’s action. This is indicated by the
dotted lines in the right panel of Figure 1.
Although A repeatedly reacts to fixed “actions” made by B, the
model that guides B’s behavior does not change over time and
so there is “no closing of the loop.” Accordingly, the emergent
qualities of such interactions are limited; hence, no reciprocal
transformation can happen from T1 until T4. While temporally
dynamic, such controlled interchanges are no more than “pseudo
social interaction.”
It has repeatedly been criticized that classic ToM tests allow for
a bystander or spectator stance toward others rather than involv-
ing a stance of participation and involvement (e.g., Schilbach
et al., 2006; Reddy, 2008). This critique raises the question
whether current neuroscientific paradigms succeed in investigat-
ing the neural basis of minds that truly interact, as illustrated in
the left panel of Figure 1. Despite the astute variety of creative
and visionary approaches to operationalize social cognition and
interaction, it is goes without saying that the degrees of freedom
for real-life social responses and interactions in the scanner envi-
ronment are limited. In the next paragraph, we will briefly review
the social neuroscience literature, discuss some exemplary types
of social interaction, and present some of the results. Please note,
however, that we cannot provide a full review of social neuro-
science literature, as this would go far beyond the scope of this
article.
PARADIGMS IN SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE TO STUDY
SOCIAL COGNITION
One major challenge in social neuroscience is creating real social
cognition and social interaction within the non-social environ-
ments associated with neuroscientific methods such as fMRI,
EEG, MEG, or TMS. To confront these challenges, neuroscien-
tists have used a rather large diversity of methods and paradigms.
One specifically promising category of such paradigms is based
on the use of game-theory derived from economic research and
now widely used in neuroeconomics. In such economic game
paradigms, one subject, typically lying in the scanner, engages
in monetary exchange with real or pretended playing partners
situated either outside of the scanner in another room (e.g.,
McCabe et al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2002, 2004, 2008; Gallagher
and Frith, 2003; Sanfey et al., 2003; Singer et al., 2004a; Fehr and
Camerer, 2007; Baumgartner et al., 2008, 2011; for an overview
see Glimcher et al., 2009) or in another scanner in the context of
hyper-scanning experiments (Montague et al., 2002).
Among other research questions, one focus of these studies was
to examine whether brain responses of subjects differ as a func-
tion of whether they believe that they are interacting with a real
human partner or simply with a computer or a non-intentional
playing partner (e.g., McCabe et al., 2001; Gallagher et al., 2002;
Singer et al., 2004b). McCabe et al. (2001) were among the first to
conduct experiments on playing a two-person game in the scan-
ner. The subjects played either with another alleged person or
a computer and were asked to make choices in the game tree.
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They all cooperated less in the condition under which they
thought that they were playing with an algorithm. Moreover, the
mere belief that they were playing with a human being resulted in
the activation of specific regions of the prefrontal cortex.
Gallagher et al. (2002) introduced the “stone-paper-scissors”
game in a PET paradigm. Their goal was to “investigate the
neural substrates of ‘on-line’ mentalizing” (p. 814). Again, the sub-
jects believed that they were either playing with another person
(whom they met shortly before) or a computer, while in fact all
responses were constantly generated by a computer program. As
the respective neural substrate of the alleged social encounter,
Gallagher et al. (2002) recorded activity in the anterior portion
of paracingulate cortex bilaterally.
Similarly, Sanfey et al. (2003) scanned subjects playing the
Ultimatum Game (UG) who had to respond to fair as well as
unfair offers. Unfair offers elicited anger and rejection in the par-
ticipants when another person to whom they had been introduced
beforehand made them but not when these unfair offers were
made by a computer. In the case of the illusion of interacting
with a conspecific, the anterior insulae, the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, and the ACC showed higher activation.
Rilling et al. (2004) tried to create a paradigm that allowed
for the “immersion of participants in real social interaction that
have personally meaningful consequences” (p. 1694) by scanning
subjects while playing the UG and the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
(PDG) using both, assumed human and computer partners, out-
side the scanner. These studies demonstrated that these tasks only
activated the ToM network (including the anterior paracingulate
cortex, the posterior, and mid-STS, as well as the hippocampus
and regions of the hypothalamus) when the subjects believed
that they were playing with real human beings. Just like in the
studies conducted by Gallagher et al. (2002) and Sanfey et al.
(2003), the illusion that a real partner B was present elicited
different brain patterns than if the partner was assumed to be
artificial.
Finally, Singer et al. (2004b) involved participants in sequential
trust games with intentional or non-intentional playing part-
ners and revealed, in line with the findings above, that only
when subjects believed to play with intentional agents, emotion-
related brain activation (e.g., in the left amygdala, the insulae, and
reward-related areas) were induced when perceiving intentional
co-operator or defector faces as compared to neutral players.
Another set of paradigms focused on measuring the effects of
directed or averted gaze on neural processes. For example, in an
early PET study, Wicker and colleagues (1998) investigated the
neural activation of mutual gaze (“a psychological process during
which two persons have the feeling of a brief link between their two
minds”, p. 221). Subjects were shown videos of persons looking
toward them (in a mutual gaze condition) or away (in an averted
gaze condition). This study revealed that eye contact activates the
occipital part of the fusiform gyrus, the right parietal lobule, the
right inferior temporal gyrus, and the middle temporal gyrus in
both hemispheres. Further effects of eye contact were presented
by Kampe et al. (2001) who demonstrated that the perceived
attractiveness of an unfamiliar face depicted on still photographs
augmented activity in the ventral striatum when the viewer met
the person’s gaze, whereas it decreased in the absence of direct
eye contact. Central reward-related brain areas seem, thus, to be
engaged during direct but not averted gaze when presented with
still pictures of human faces.
In more recent eye-gaze paradigms, Schilbach et al. (2006,
2010a,b) sought to characterize neural correlates of being person-
ally involved in social interaction by introducing more dynamic
virtual-reality technologies in the scanner environment. Virtual
characters were created that gazed at and greeted others—either
the subjects (who were lying passively in the scanner) or a
bystander. One of their main neuroscientific findings was that the
vMPFC underlies the perception of social communication and
feeling of personal involvement (Schilbach et al., 2006). Moreover,
when the sharing of attention with the avatar was self-initiated
by the participants, this led to an increase of neural activity in
the ventral striatum (Schilbach et al., 2010a). Similarly, Wilms
et al. (2010) tried to study social encounters in a truly interac-
tive manner. They asked subjects in the scanner to respond or to
probe the gaze of another person, depicted as an anthropomor-
phic avatar (who was actually computer-operated). The subject’s
goal was to establish eye contact with the avatar and to jointly
attend to one of three objects on a screen as a function of the
subject’s eye-gaze. This method of interactive eye-tracking reflects
the attempt to close the interaction loop between A and B. More
precisely, Wilms et al. (2010) were interested in the neural differ-
ences of successfully initiating joint attention compared to mere
gaze following. In this regard, they reported a main effect of joint
attention that resulted in the activation of the mPFC, PCC, and
the anterior temporal poles.
Another type of social neuroscience paradigms involves the
presence of real people present in the scanner environment. For
example in empathy for pain research, subjects in the scanner
were coupled with either their loved ones (Singer et al., 2004a)
or unfamiliar persons who differed in important aspects such
as perceived fairness or group membership (Singer et al., 2006;
Hein et al., 2010) who sat outside of the scanner room but
visible to the subjects. In these paradigms, brain responses are
elicited by creating the experience of painful shocks in the sub-
jects. This first-personal pain response is compared with those
brain responses elicited when watching the real person present in
the same room suffering from pain.
Finally, some recent innovative paradigms have started to use
cross-correlational statistics to compare brain activity of two indi-
viduals involved in a task together (Schippers et al., 2010; Anders
et al., 2011). For example, Schippers et al. (2010) asked cou-
ples of participants to play charades in the scanner in order to
examine brain activity during longer streams of social commu-
nication. Both of their brains were measured at separate times
in the same scanner (thus, the authors did not draw on hyper-
scanning technology). In one session, brain activity was recorded
during the gesturing of a word for the partner. This gesturing was
videotaped so that their partners could guess it in the subsequent
scanning session. Results show that during guessing, the subject’s
brain activity in the putative MNS and the vmPFC is caused by
fluctuations in activity in the pMNS of the gesturing partner.
All the above-mentioned studies have been conducted with
imaging methods. What about EEG-studies investigating social
processes? Lindenberger et al. (2009) investigated interbrain
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synchronization when eight pairs of guitar players performed a
short piece together. They found significant between-brain oscil-
latory couplings during the preparatory period of metronome
tempo setting in especially the fronto-central connections in the
frequency range between 2 and 10Hz, as well as after the play
onset in the frequency range between 0.5 and 7.5Hz. According
to the authors, this coupling can be interpreted as a sign for social
attunement.
In another EEG-study, Kourtis et al. (2010) registered the
brain couplings of two persons who “interacted,” i.e., passed each
other an object and then put it back on its original place. The
authors then compared these EEG-measures with the brain activ-
ity of a third-person who only watched this interaction. The two
interacting persons showed more motor activation during action
anticipation than the “loner” who was not involved in the action.
This motor activation was measured via the amplitude of the
contingent negative variation (CNV), known to reflect motor
preparation and activity in both the supplementary motor area
(SMA) and the primary motor cortex (MI). Kourtis et al. (2010)
suggest that this data indicates that social interaction modulates
action simulation.
HAS SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE REALLY YET SUCCEED IN
STUDYING SOCIAL INTERACTION?
The previous section reviewed social neuroscience paradigms that
have tried to investigate the neural basis of social cognition and
social interaction using real-life experimental set-ups or cross-
brain correlational methods rather than the presentation of static
pictures such as faces or stories. However, when these are consid-
ered in light of our definition of real social interaction, a closer
analysis reveals that none of these paradigms demonstrate a pat-
tern of actions and reactions in which living and uncontrolled
partners engage in behavior that leads to reciprocal impact on
each other’s behavior. For example, experiments relying on game
theory paradigms have had complete control over playing partner
B’s responses (see right panel of Figure 1). McCabe et al. (2001)
used the game tree, which offers limited response options: partic-
ipants were presented to a dichotomous choice (they had to select
either the left or the right branch of the tree). Moreover, player A
was made to play with a partner who was fully controlled. Sanfey
et al. (2003) and Rilling et al. (2004) were also unable to establish
real social interaction. Even though the subjects met their partner
(B) before scanning started and saw B’s photo in the scanner, there
was no opportunity for real interaction. These “interactional”
degrees of freedom offered just two options—either acceptance
or rejection of B’s (again fully pre-fabricated) offer.
Similarly, the paradigms created by Schilbach and colleagues
do not constitute real social interaction because even though
B reacts to A’s behavior, B’s response is programmed by the exper-
imenter and so lacks the unpredictability of a real person. Despite
its novelty relative to the previous social neuroscience paradigms,
the use of still pictures of faces as outlined above offers no emer-
gent qualities of real interaction. Schippers et al. (2010) presented
a different and ambitious approach to the “information flow across
brains during social interactions” (p. 9391). Nevertheless, each
trial of guessing the action ended without the other’s sponta-
neous feedback, and the subjects gestured the word-to-be-guessed
in a video camera instead of directly toward the partner’s face,
therefore we can conclude that, although this experiment cap-
tures naturalistic complex symbolic and non-verbal behavior, the
“loop” was never fully closed within a single interaction. The
sought-after information flow from one brain to another was not
really flowing.
Finally, the empathy paradigms (Singer et al., 2004a, 2006;
Hein et al., 2010), even though integrating authentic uncon-
strained (and uncontrolled) partners in the same scanner envi-
ronment, can again not be considered as real social interaction
paradigms, as the response of B is not important for the analyses
or claims of this investigation. The only thing that matters is the
brain response of A.
Do the EEG-studies capture real social interaction? Although
Lindenberger et al. (2009) studied coordinated action, this again
do not fulfill our criteria of studying real social interaction. The
guitar players follow a common goal (performing a specific piece
together over 60 trials), preventing opportunities for creative
actions and responses. For real musical interaction to be stud-
ied, it would be necessary to record the brain activities while two
individuals, for example, improvise. Imagine for example jazz
improvisation, where the tunes emerges through the reciprocal
impact that one players melody has on the other player’s tune and
by doing so capture real elements of social interaction. During
improvisation, repetition, and predictable responses are nearly
impossible because each individual’s contribution emerges from
the process of listening and replying to the other (Seddon, 2005).
An additional worry concerning these studies is that observed
between-brain oscillation can also be explained by the fact that
the musicians are merely following the same synchronizing stim-
ulus (i.e., the metronom or the melody they play). This would
then again not be an example of real social interaction but
similar to two persons watching the same movie, and whose
brain activities consequently are synchronized by this same visual
material.
Also, in Kourtis et al.’s (2010) EEG-study two persons “inter-
act,” but only in the sense that they pass each other an object.
Although this counts as interaction because the subjects are real
living persons who can act jointly in a face-to-face setting, the
paradigm restricted the type of interaction that was possible and
so the two minds do not mutually shape each other by the unpre-
dictability of their responses. Due to the limited range of behavior
and the restricted possibility for emergent qualities, we do not see
the closing of the loop here, neither.
In sum, this short review has shown that even though some of
these studies provided innovative ways to study social cognition,
they still fail to capture real social interaction and so fall short of
revealing the neural processes that occur during online social cog-
nition. However, what could be investigated were indeed several
forms of second-person perspective taking.
IS THERE EVIDENCE FOR PURELY SOCIAL PROCESSES
AND COMPUTATIONS IN THE HUMAN BRAIN?
Our short review about some social neuroscience studies with
associated neuronal findings point to another important question
raised in this paper. Can we assume that the brain contains spe-
cific modules only devoted to the processing of social stimuli or,
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even more radically, specific brain regions or specific cells tuned
to online social cognition. More precisely, we are distinguish-
ing between two separate questions: (a) To what extend is the
so-called social brain specifically social? and (b) Are there neu-
ronal networks, computations or single cells specifically tuned to
process only online social interactions?
A closer look into the brain areas involved in the social neu-
roscience experiments reviewed suggest that the answer to both
questions is no. To answer question (a), the social brain is not
exclusively social; rather, each of these brain regions has been
shown to also be involved in other non-social tasks. For exam-
ple, even though “the meeting of minds” (Amodio and Frith, 2006)
certainly has hedonic qualities andmay “feel good” (see Schilbach
et al., 2010a), the ventral striatum or other reward-related brain
areas cannot be seen as specific neural correlates of the second-
person perspective or of mutual social interaction because these
brain areas are known to be sensitive to all kinds of rewards, be it
social or non-social (e.g., Schultz, 2002; O’Doherty et al., 2006).
Hence, these regions will also be equally strongly involved in
pleasant non-social activities such as indulging in a glass of high-
class Bordeaux. Similarly, the consistent involvement of anterior
insula and mACC in empathy for pain paradigms (see Lamm
et al., 2011) does not make these brain regions specific “empathy
regions.” On the contrary, these “shared activation” studies reveal
that these regions are also involved in processing negative affec-
tive experiences in the self or in other non-social context (see also
Singer, 2012).
The phenomenon of ticklishness when being tickled by others
but not by oneself, as mentioned earlier, can be taken as a good
example to discuss the question to whether a specific neural sys-
tem is responsible for social interaction. This phenomenon does
not occur because of unique neural computations specialized for
being tickled but rather emerges from more general predictive
properties of our sensory and motor system and the fact that we
can predict the effects of our own actions but not those of others5.
Accordingly, online social cognition could be explained by under-
standing how different basic cognitive, emotional, and motor
processes and their underlying brain mechanisms cooperate to
produce representations of the actions, sensations, or mental state
of another individual. Hence, a review of the present social neuro-
science literature does not support the claim that neural processes
or computations that specifically subserve the processing of social
stimuli exist. In sum, the answer to question (a) would be that
to the best of our knowledge so far, no neural computations or
neuronal networks specifically dedicated to social stimuli or social
cognition alone have been identified.
Would this conclusion have to change if eventually neuroscien-
tists succeed in bringing real social interactions into neuroscience
paradigms? The hope of identifying neuronal networks, neu-
ral computations, or even single cells, that would selectively
only react when we are involved in online social cognition,
seems—given the hitherto existing neuroscientific evidence—
simply highly unlikely. For this to be the case, our brains would
5Note that this does of course not imply that unpredictability is a sufficient
condition for being a person or for an action to be social interaction.
need to contain cells or perform computations that are only sen-
sitive to the interactive nature of two intentional living agents but
are silent whenmerely one agent is concerned, even if this involves
the processing of social stimuli. Following this line of reasoning,
the answer to question (b) would again have to be no.
Having said this, we would, however, expect that social interac-
tion might activate neuronal patterns (but not hitherto unknown
areas) different from situations where subjects are not personally
being involved. Still, this effect would come as no surprise, as it
may just stem from mere attention and saliency effects known to
modulate activation patterns in the brain. The brains of subjects
being half asleep will obviously show a different activation pattern
than a highly engaged subject irrespective of whether this subject
is engaged in social or non-social information processing.
Note also, that even though we have argued that social neu-
roscience has not yet succeeded in implementing real social
interaction paradigms, the so-called social brain circuitries have
nevertheless been discovered and repeatedly described on the
basis of subjects merely believing in the presence of another
interaction partner.
Even though the implementation of real social interaction
paradigms may not reveal novel brain mechanisms exclusively
devoted to social cognition or social interaction, it is important to
stress at this point that the implementation of real-life social inter-
active paradigms can, nonetheless, inform our understanding of
social dynamics and the psychological phenomena that emerge in
these conditions. Social interaction is a central and enormously
important factor for human evolution, ontogeny, and daily life,
for example, in the development of individual personhood or self-
consciousness. In evolutionary terms, for example, it has been
argued that the demands of interacting with group members have
been a vital and a powerful influence on the size of the neo-cortex
of the brain (as measured by the ratio between the volume of
medulla oblongata and neocortex Dunbar, 1998). According to
this social brain hypothesis, the need to understand other minds, as
well as the related processes of communication and self-control,
drove an increase in neo-cortical volumes in mammals, particu-
larly in primates. Social environments are also important at an
ontogenetic level. Anecdotal evidence from the eighteenth cen-
tury indicates that isolation from the social group, such as that
experienced by feral children like theWildboy of Averyon, leads to
problems with developing more than rudimentary skills essential
for social interaction (Zingg, 1940). More recent studies showed
that human psychosocial development is largely influenced by
the quality of parent-child interactions (Beebe et al., 2008).
Furthermore, developmental psychologists have stated that it is
through interactive sharing that children ontogenetically acquire
the capacity of taking and confronting intersubjective perspec-
tives, i.e., understanding other minds (Moll and Meltzoff, 2011).
We argue that face-to-face encounters are a necessary condition
for social cognitive abilities to evolve, but that, once in place, other
minds can also be understood when the persons are not engaging
in real social interaction. Therefore, we have challenged the cur-
rently widespread narrow definition of second-perspective taking.
In sum, at both the level of evolution and of ontogeny, immersion
in a complex social environment seems necessary for the human
mind to develop normally.
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Future investigations of online social cognition could
be inspired by paradigms developed in developmental and
attachment psychology (as conducted by Tronick et al., 1978;
Tronick, 2003, and, more recently, Beebe et al., 2008). The sub-
jects in these studies, mainly mothers and their babies, are given
time and space to interact naturally and face-to-face with one
another. They play with each other, mirror, and validate the
other’s expression, misunderstand one another, undergo com-
municative disruptions, and by return engage in so-called repair
processes of these mismatches—or they do not. A detailed micro-
analytic decomposition of the interplay may reveal features of
individual, natural interaction that are important for further
investigations in developmental, social, or clinical psychology,
but will perhaps not be that useful for the identification of
specifically social neuronal computations in particular. This is, of
course, not to say that social interaction should not be investi-
gated in the context of social neuroscience. Thus, even though its
study may not be about understanding new brain processes, it is
about understanding how existing brain processes are deployed
and influenced in a particular dynamic during social interaction.
Furthermore, investigating real interaction might enable social
neuroscience to shed more light on some of the classical prob-
lems of social psychology like conformity (Asch, 1951; Milgram,
1963) or decision-making in groups (Surowiecki, 2004).
CONCLUSION
Moving toward an understanding of the neural basis of social
interaction is one of the main goals in social neuroscience. In this
paper, we asked why social interaction is accredited with such a
central significance. We showed that its definition, as well as the
definition of the terms on- vs. offline social cognition and second-
person perspective taking is imprecise leading to confusion.
Furthermore, significant problems emerge when the philosoph-
ical, psychological, and neuroscientific investigations concerning
the understanding of other minds are simply mapped to each
other. We have also reviewed relevant neuroscientific studies that
focus on social interaction and have demonstrated that none to
date have investigated real social interaction, understood as the
emergent qualities of an encounter that occur through the recip-
rocal interaction of two real individuals. In this sense, true social
interaction remains the “dark matter” of social neuroscience.
However, this is not as daunting as it may seem at a first glace.
First, understanding other minds is not bound to interaction
because it is an epistemic perspective rather than a process tied
to online social cognition. Second, the specific neural correlates
of reciprocal interaction are unlikely to differ from those that
have already been identified by prior work. Third, even though
our short review has shown that no studies have captured online
social cognition during real social engagement, they have cap-
tured important features of second-person perspective taking and
so do reveal important information on how we make sense of
other minds. We suggest that this should be the focus of future
work investigating mental states attribution. Rather than seeking
neural substrates for computations that can only be performed
during social interaction, research on how we understand other
minds would be more likely to be informative if it examined
how basic cognitive and affective processes are deployed to cope
with the demands placed on the mind by the complex interac-
tions that make the social lives of our species so remarkable.
In this way neuroscience can help us understand the way that
social interaction continues to shape our evolution, ontogeny, and
every-day lives.
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